Fiscal Instruments, Political Business Cycles and the Emu, Some Stylized Facts

A.A. Andrikopoulos, John Loizides and K.P. Prodromidis

Athens University of Economics and Business from Athens University of Economics and Business, Department of International and European Economic Studies

Abstract: This paper examines whether incumbent national governments of the member states of the European Union have manipulated the fiscal policy instruments at their disposal in order to create national political business cycles, opportunistic or partisan, in the 1970-98 period.

Keywords: ELECTIONS; GOVERNMENT; FISCAL POLICY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E3 E6 H8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001

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