Endogenous Wage-Compliance and "Underground" Wages in Oligopoly

Minas Vlassis ()

Athens University of Economics and Business from Athens University of Economics and Business, Department of International and European Economic Studies

Abstract: This paper investigates whether compliance with sectoral wages, or "underground" wages (i.e. equilibrium wages lower than the, officially minimum, sectoral ones), may emerge endogenously in industries with market power. Wage bargaining is centralized and it is conducted by large-scale efficient firms and their own union. Small-scale inefficient firms are officially considered to be wage-takers.

Keywords: WAGES; BARGAINING; OLIGOPOLIES (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J50 J31 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:athebu:98

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