Simultaneous Ooled Auctions

Flavio Menezes () and P.K. Monteiro

Working Papers from Australian National University - Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper is organized as follows. Section 1 is an introduction. section we review the existing research on (sequential) pooled auctions. section 3m formalized our model of simultaneous ooled suctions while in the section 4 we derive the equilibrium bidding strategies. Section 5 contains the revenue comparison for the case of identical objects and the expected revenue in the case of perfectly correlated objects.

Keywords: AUCTIONS; GAME THEORY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996

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Related works:
Working Paper: Simultaneous Pooled Auctions (1996)
Journal Article: Simultaneous Pooled Auctions (1998)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:aunaec:302

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