A Note on Auctions with Endogenous Participation

Flavio Menezes () and Paulo Klinger Monteiro

Working Papers from Australian National University - Department of Economics

Abstract: In this paper, we study an auction where bidders only know the number of potential applicants.

Keywords: AUCTIONS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D40 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: Written
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Working Paper: A Note on Auctions with Endogenous Participation (1996)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:aunaec:312

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