Discrete Public Goods With Incomplete Information

Flavio Menezes (), Paulo Klinger Monteiro and A. Temini

Working Papers from Australian National University - Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper investigates a simultaneous discrete public good provision game with incomplete information. To use the terminology of Admati and Perry (1991), we consider both contribution and subscription games. In the former, contributions are not refunded if the project is not completed, while in the latter they are.

Keywords: GAME THEORY; INFORMATION; PUBLIC GOODS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D79 D89 H89 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998

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Related works:
Working Paper: Discrete Public Goods with Incomplete Information (1999)
Working Paper: Discrete Public goods with incomplete information (1999)
Working Paper: Discrete Public Goods with Incomplete Information (1998)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:aunaec:348

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