Property Rights, Incomplete Contracts, and Social Harm

R. Pitchford and Christopher Mark Snyder ()

Working Papers from Australian National University - Department of Economics

Abstract: The authors construct a model in which a first mover decides on its location before it knows the identity of the second mover; joint location results in a negative externality. Contracts are inherently incomplete since the first mover's initial decision cannot be specified. The authors analyze several kinds of rights, including damages, injunctions, and rights to exclude (arising from covenants or land ownership).

Keywords: PROPERTY RIGHTS; EXTERNALITIES; GAME THEORY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K11 D23 C78 H23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
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