Synergies and Price Trends in Sequential Auctions

Flavio Menezes () and Paulo Klinger Monteiro

Working Papers from Australian National University - Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper considers sequential auctions where an individual's value for a bundle of objects is either greater than the sum of the values for the objects separately (positive synergy) or less than the sum (negative synergy). The authors show that the existence of positive synergies implies declining expected prices. When synergies are negative, expected prices are increasing.

Keywords: AUCTIONS; GAME THEORY; PRICES (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: Written
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Related works:
Working Paper: Synergies and Price Trends in Sequential Auctions (1999)
Working Paper: Synergies and Price Trends in Sequential Auctions (1999)
Journal Article: Synergies and price trends in sequential auctions (2003)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:aunaec:366

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