Median Voter Preferences, Central Bank Independence and Conservatis

Working Papers from Banca Italia - Servizio di Studi

Abstract: This paper studies how the independence and conservatism of a central bankrelate to the structure and stability of median voter preferences. This is done by means of a model of endogenous delegation in which an opportunistic policy-maker chooses the monetary regime (independence and conservatism) to maximise the welfare of median voter.

Keywords: CENTRAL BANKS; ELECTIONS; MEDIAN VOTER (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D73 E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
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Journal Article: Median Voter Preferences, Central Bank Independence and Conservatism (2000)
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