Stackelberg Leadership and Transfers in Private Provision of Public Goods

W. Buchhilz, Kai A. Konrad () and K.E. Lommerund
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Kjell Erik Lommerud ()

Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen from Department of Economics, University of Bergen

Abstract: We consider transfers in a Stackelberg game of private provision of a public good. It turns out that the agent who is the follower in the process of making voluntary contributions to a public good may have an incentive to make monetary transfers to the Stackelberg leader even in a situation where neither has a comparative advantage in making contributions to the public good.

Keywords: GAMES; PUBLIC GOODS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997
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Journal Article: Stackelberg leadership and transfers in private provision of public goods (1997)
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More papers in Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen from Department of Economics, University of Bergen
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