Environmental Taxes on Exhaustible Resources

Eirik S. Amundsen () and R. Schob
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Ronnie Schoeb ()

Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen from Department of Economics, University of Bergen

Abstract: Environmental problems are tied to the use of exhaustible resources. A resource tax extracts rents from the resource owning countries, whitout creating significant incentives for consumers to reduce their resource consumption. The placement of the tax burden on resource owners affects the international distribution of wealth. In this paper we show that it is optimal for small countries who do not coordinate their national environmental policies, to impose a time-variant Pigovian tax.

Keywords: ENVIRONMENT; TAXATION; RENT (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H21 H23 Q38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:bereco:192

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