Cooperation without Reputation: Experimental Evidence from Prisoner's Dilemma Games

Russell Cooper (), Douglas V. DeJong and Thomas Wayne Ross

Working Papers from Boston University - Industry Studies Programme

Date: 1992-08

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Working Paper: Cooperation without Reputation: Experimental Evidence from Prisoner's Dilemma Games (1992)
Journal Article: Cooperation without Reputation: Experimental Evidence from Prisoner's Dilemma Games (1996)
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