Investment Incentives of a Regulated Dominant Firm

G. Biglaiser and Ching-to Albert Ma ()

Working Papers from Boston University - Industry Studies Programme

Abstract: We study the investment incentives of a regulated, incumbent firm in a deregulation process. The regulator cannot commit to a long-term regulatory policy, and investment decisions are taken before optimal regulatory policies are imposed. We characterize the regulated incumbent's incentive to invest when a deregulation process is initiated and an unregulated firm enters the market as a result.

Keywords: INVESTMENTS; ENTERPRISES; DEREGULATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D20 D21 L20 M10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996

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Related works:
Working Paper: Investment Incentives of a Regulated Dominant Firm (1996)
Working Paper: Investment Incentives of a Regulated Dominant Firm (1996)
Journal Article: Investment Incentives of a Regulated Dominant Firm (1999)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:bostin:67

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