Cost and Quantity Invcentives in Health Care: Altruistic Providers

Ching-to Albert Ma ()

Working Papers from Boston University - Industry Studies Programme

Abstract: This paper compares the cost and quality incentive effects of cost reimbursement and prospective payment systems in the health industru when providers are altuistic. Provider's behavioral rule is governed by a desire to maximize a weighted sum of profit and consumers' health benefit.

Keywords: COSTS; DUMPTING; HEALTH SERVICES (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I10 I18 L10 L50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:bostin:84

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Boston University - Industry Studies Programme
Address: Boston University, Industry Studies Program; Department of Economics, 270 Bay Road, Boston, Massachusetts 02215.
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Thomas Krichel ().