Central Bank Independence, Fiscal Responsability, and the Goals of Macroeconomic Policy: An American Perspective of the New Zealand Experience

Ralph C. Bryant

Working Papers from Brookings Institution - Working Papers

Abstract: In contemporary New Zealand, microeconomics is in the ascendant over macroeconomics, to such an extent that neither the Reserve Bank nor the Cabinet and Treasury appear to give much attention to shorter-run macroeconomic stabilization as a policy goal. This lecture examines why thoughtful New Zealanders are attracted to this atypical aversion, and asks whether that aversion is in New Zealand's best interests.

Keywords: ECONOMIC POLICY; FINANCIAL POLICY; MACROECONOMICS; CENTRAL BANKS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E50 E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:brooki:126

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