Why the Poor Do not Expropriate the Rich in Democracies: A New Argument

John Roemer ()

Working Papers from California Davis - Institute of Governmental Affairs

Keywords: DEMOCRACY; POLITICAL ECONOMY; POVERTY; RESOURCE ALLOCATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D72 I30 I32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1995
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Working Paper: Why the Poor Do not Expropriate the Rich in Democracies: A New Argument (1995)
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Address: UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA DAVIS, INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, RESEARCH PROGRAM IN APPLIED MACROECONOMICS AND MACRO POLICY, DAVIS CALIFORNIA 95616 U.S.A.
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