RECENT RESULTS ON BELIEF, KNOWLEDGE AND THE EPISTEMIC FOUNDATIONS OF GAME THEORY

Pierpaolo Battigali and Giacomo Bonanno ()
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Pierpaolo Battigalli ()

Department of Economics from California Davis - Department of Economics

Abstract: We provide a self-contained, selective overview of the literature on the role of knowledge and beliefs in game theory. We focus on recent results on the epistemic foundations of solution concepts, including correlated equilibrium, rationalizability in dynamic games, forward and backward induction.

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Journal Article: Recent results on belief, knowledge and the epistemic foundations of game theory (1999)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:caldec:98-14

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