Abstract:
This paper investigates the presence of electoral and partisan cycles in the fiscal policy of Canadian provinces. We find strong evidence of electoral cycles in the form of large differences in the average change in the discretionary primary deficit between election and non-election years.
Keywords:FISCAL POLICY; ELECTIONS; GOVERNMENT (search for similar items in EconPapers) JEL-codes:D73H30 (search for similar items in EconPapers) Date: 1998
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More papers in Working Papers from Calgary - Department of Economics Address: THE UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, 2500 UNIVERSITY DRIVE N.W. CALGARY ALBERTA CANADA T2N 1N4. Contact information at EDIRC. Series data maintained by Thomas Krichel ().
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