Working Papers from California Irvine - School of Social Sciences
Abstract:
A leader of an organization may view a subordinate as threatening or weakening the leader's position. The threat may increase with the subordinate's ability and reduce the rents the leader wins. In particular, a leader who trains his subordinate reduces the cost to the owner of a firm in replacing the leader, and so reduces the leader's bargaining power.
Keywords:COSTS; LEADERSHIP; RENT (search for similar items in EconPapers) JEL-codes:M13 (search for similar items in EconPapers) Date: 2000
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Related works: Working Paper: Subordinates as Threats to Leaders (2001) This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
More papers in Working Papers from California Irvine - School of Social Sciences Address: UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA IRVINE, SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, IRVINECALIFORNIA 91717 U.S.A. Series data maintained by Thomas Krichel ().
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