Term Length and the Quality of Appointment

Amihai Glazer and Vesa Kanniainen

Working Papers from California Irvine - School of Social Sciences

Abstract: Consider a principal who appoints an agent. Let the agent potentially serve for a sufficiently long time that one principal is replaced by another over this period. Suppose also that the quality of the agent appointed increases with the effort the incumbent principal devotes to hiring. Then the quality of the appointment may increase with the length of the agent's term.

Keywords: WORKERS; LABOUR RELATIONS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J53 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000

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Working Paper: Term Length and the Quality of Appointments (2000)
Working Paper: Term Length and the Quality of Appointments (2000)
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