Optimal Promotion and Span of Control

Amihai Glazer

Working Papers from California Irvine - School of Social Sciences

Abstract: Let an organization, such as a government or a firm, evaluate projects with the aim of maximizing social welfare or profits. Each project is evaluated by an agent, who may err. Some agents, however, are more likely to make a correct evaluation. Agents may revealed as making correct evaluations can be promoted to evaluate projects. The paper considers the optimal allocation of project evaluations to agents under these conditions.

Keywords: SOCIAL WELFARE; OPTIMIZATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C61 D60 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:calirv:99-00-22

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