The Political Economy of Branching Restrictions and Deposit Insurance: A Model of Monopolistic Competition Among Small and Large Banks

Nicholas S. Economides (), Robert Glenn Hubbard () and D. Palia

Working Papers from Columbia - Graduate School of Business

Keywords: POLITICAL ECONOMY; INSURANCE; BANKS; MONOPOLIES; FINANCIAL MARKET (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 G20 G21 L12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1995
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Related works:
Working Paper: The Political Economy of Branching Restrictions and Deposit Insurance: A Model of Monopolistic Competition Among Small and Large Banks (1993)
Working Paper: The Political Economy of Branching Restrictions and Deposit Insurance: A Model of Monopolistic Competition among Small and Large Banks (1996)
Journal Article: The Political Economy of Branching Restrictions and Deposit Insurance: A Model of Monopolistic Competition among Small and Large Banks (1996)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:colubu:95-14

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