Understanding the Determinants of Mangerial Ownership and the Link Between Ownership and Performance

C.P. Himmelberg, Robert Glenn Hubbard () and D. Palia

Working Papers from Columbia - Graduate School of Business

Abstract: Firms are governed by a network of relationships representing contractual arangements for financing, capital structure, and managerial ownership and compensation, among others. For any of these contracted arrangements, it is difficult to identify the correpondence between the contractual choice and firm performance (e.g., measured by accounting rates of return or Tobin's Q), because contractual choices and performance outcomes are endogenously determined by exogenous and only partly observed changes in the firm's contracting environment.

Keywords: OWNERSHIP; CONTRACTS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G31 G32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997

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Related works:
Working Paper: Understanding the Determinants of Managerial Ownership and the Link Between Ownership and Performance (2000)
Journal Article: Understanding the determinants of managerial ownership and the link between ownership and performance (1999)
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