Capacity Cjoices and Price Competition in Experimental Market

V. Anderhub, W. Guth, U. Kamecke and Hans-Theo Normann ()

Working Papers from Flinders of South Australia - Discipline of Economics

Abstract: In the heterogeneous experimental oligopoly markets of this paper, sellers first choose capacities and then prices. In equilibrium, capacities should correspond to the Cournot prediction. In the experimental data, given capacities, observed price setting behavior is in general consistent with the theory. Capacities converge above the Cournot level. Sellers rarely manage to cooperate.

Keywords: PRICING; COMPETITION; ECONOMIC MODELS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D42 D41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001

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Related works:
Working Paper: Capacity Choices and Price Competition in Experimental Markets
Journal Article: Capacity Choices and Price Competition in Experimental Markets (2003)
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