Regional Integration and Lobbying for Tariffs Against Non-Members

Olivier Cadot (), Jaime de Melo () and Marcelo Olarreaga ()

University of Geneva Economics Working Papers from University of Geneva, Department of Political Economy

Abstract: Using an extension of the influence-driven lobbying approach developed by Grossman and Helpman, we study the impact of regional trading arrangements (RIAS) on trade policy towards non-members in a three-good, three-country model.

Keywords: TARIFFS; ECONOMIC INTEGRATION; TRADE; INTERNATIONAL TRADE; POLITICAL ECONOMY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F10 F11 F13 F15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996
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Working Paper: Regional Integration and Lobbying for Tariffs Against Non-members (1996)
Journal Article: Regional Integration and Lobbying for Tariffs against Nonmembers (1999)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:geneec:96.07

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