Lobbying and the Structure of Protection

Olivier Cadot (), J de Mela and Marcelo Olarreaga ()

University of Geneva Economics Working Papers from University of Geneva, Department of Political Economy

Abstract: This paper extends the influence-driven model of trade policy determination to include general equilibrium effets on the supply side resulting from labour-market interaction and intermediate goods. The model's predictions for the structure of protection are related to underlying taste and technology parameters, and we derive analytically several propositions that are consistent with the stylized results of the empirical literature.

Keywords: COMMERCIAL; POLICY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996
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Working Paper: Lobbying and the Structure of Protection (1996)
Working Paper: Lobbying and the Structure of Protection (1997)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:geneec:96.14

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