Abstract:
This paper studies the question of optimal taxation of housing, when the set of tax instruments at the government's disposal is not artificially restricted. There are two groups of persons who differ in earning abilities and in tastes, and two types of housing goods (high- and low-quality). The paper characterizes the Pareto-efficient allocations that are attainable trough the tax policy.
Keywords:TAXATION; EFFICIENCY (search for similar items in EconPapers) JEL-codes:H21D61 (search for similar items in EconPapers) Date: 1996
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Related works: Journal Article: On Optimal Taxation of Housing (1998) This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
More papers in Working Papers from Toulouse - GREMAQ Address: GREMAQ, Universite de Toulouse I Place Anatole France 31042 - Toulouse CEDEX France. Contact information at EDIRC. Series data maintained by Thomas Krichel ().
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