Intra-Day Dynamics in Sequential Auctions: Theory and Estimation

Jean-Jacques Laffont, Patrice Loisel () and J. Robert

Working Papers from Toulouse - GREMAQ

Abstract: A theoretical model of sequential first-price auctions where bidders are risk-averse and values are affiliated is developed. For constant risk-aversion utility functions and a particular specification of affiliation, closed-form solutions for the symmetric equilibrium of a sequence of k first-price auctions are obtained. The model is able to generate complex intra-day dynamics, in particular inverse U-shape series of winning bids that we have in our data set of eggplants auctions.

Keywords: AUCTIONS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
View citations in EconPapers

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:gremaq:98.488

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Toulouse - GREMAQ
Address: GREMAQ, Universite de Toulouse I Place Anatole France 31042 - Toulouse CEDEX France.
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Thomas Krichel ().