Central Funding of Local Public Works

Martin Besfamille ()

Working Papers from Toulouse - GREMAQ

Abstract: This paper formalises a three-tier administrative hierarchy. A benevolent federal government must decide how to fund an indivisible local public work, planned to be undertaken by a single firm. But the federal government observes neither the cost nor the local benefit of the project. To obtain this information, he relies on the loval authority which gains from the effective realization of the project.

Keywords: ASYMETRIC INFORMATION; PUBLIC GOODS; SOCIAL CHOICE; DECENTRALIZATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D6 D82 H4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:gremaq:99.513

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