Political Economy, Information and Incentives

Jean-Jacques Laffont

Working Papers from Toulouse - GREMAQ

Abstract: This paper shows how the instruments of incentive theory can be used to develop some views about the proper design of governments to avoid the capture of politicians and bureaucrats by interest groups.

Keywords: INFORMATION; INCENTIVES; ECONOMIC POLICY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H00 D82 D80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
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Journal Article: Political economy, information and incentives1 (1999)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:gremaq:99.516

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