Evolutionary Stability in the Rubinstein Game

R. Peters

Faechergruppe Volkswirtschaftlehre from University of Hamburg, Institute of Economics

Keywords: GAME THEORY; BARGAINING (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1995
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