Implementation and Renegotiation

Eric S. Maskin and John Moore

Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers from Harvard - Institute of Economic Research

Abstract: The paper characterises the choice rules that can be implemented when agents are unable to commit themselves not to renegotiate the mechanism.

Date: 1999
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