The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge In Two Player Games

Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine

No 1961, Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers from Harvard - Institute of Economic Research

Abstract: Abstract Not Available At This Time

Date: 2002
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Related works:
Working Paper: The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games (2004)
Journal Article: The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games (2007)
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