Why is fiscal policy often procyclical?

Alberto Alesina () and Guido Tabellini ()

No 2090, Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers from Harvard - Institute of Economic Research

Abstract: Many countries, especially developing ones, follow procyclical fiscal polices, namely spending goes up (taxes go down) in booms and spending goes down (taxes go up) in recessions. We provide an explanation for this suboptimal fiscal policy based upon political distortions and incentives for less-than-benevolent government to appropriate rents. Voters have incentives similar to the “starving the Leviathan” classic argument, and demand more public goods or fewer taxes to prevent governments from appropriating rents when the economy is doing well. We test this argument against more traditional explanations based purely on borrowing constraints, with a reasonable amount of success.

Date: Written 2005
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Related works:
Working Paper: Why Is Fiscal Policy Often Procyclical?
Working Paper: Why is Fiscal Policy often Procyclical? (2005)
Working Paper: Why is Fiscal Policy Often Procyclical? (2005)
Working Paper: Why is fiscal policy often procyclical? (2005)
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