On the Socially Optimal Patent Policy

Tuomas Takalo

University of Helsinki, Department of Economics from Department of Economics

Abstract: The performance of the institutional structure protecting intellectual property is a matter of deep concern in determining economic well-being. Unfortunately, economic theory has been of little help in providing straightforward advice for policy-makers, the range of contradictory results reported in literature being rather impressive. The aim of this article is to develop a very stylised model that encompasses a variety of different findings, and to derive a general rule for the optimal patent policy.

Keywords: PATENTS; INNOVATIONS; RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O34 O31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: Written

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