Term Length and the Quality of Appointments

Amihai Glazer and Vesa Kanniainen

University of Helsinki, Department of Economics from Department of Economics

Abstract: Consider a pricipal who appoints an agent. Let the agent potentially serve for a sufficiently long time that one principal is replaced by another over this period. Suppose also that the quality of the agent appointed increases with the effort the incumbent principal devotes to hiring. Then the quality of the appointment may increase with the length of the agent's term. Moreover, policies such as mandatory retirement which increase a principal's consern for output after he leaves office, may induce better hiring.

Keywords: APPOINTMENTS; LONG TERM; LABOUR (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J20 J40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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Working Paper: Term Length and the Quality of Appointments (2000)
Working Paper: Term Length and the Quality of Appointment (2000)
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