Abstract:
This paper analyzes how an incumbent's price policy may signal information not only on demand level but also on demand composition. We show that uniform pricing may have advantages over third degree price discrimination when there are informational asymmetries for a monopolist facing threat of entry. A signalling game with two periods and two players is considered.
Keywords:INFORMATION; PRICING; ECONOMETRICS (search for similar items in EconPapers) JEL-codes:D82C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers) Date: 1997
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More papers in ASSET - Instituto De Economia Publica from ASSET (Association of Southern European Economic Theorists) Address: ASSET - Instituto De Economia Publica Facultad de Ciencias Economicas Y Empresariales . Avenida Lehendakari Aguirre, 83. 48015 Bilbao. Spain Contact information at EDIRC. Series data maintained by Thomas Krichel ().
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