Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges

Jordi Masso and Salvador Barberà ()

ASSET - Instituto De Economia Publica from ASSET (Association of Southern European Economic Theorists)

Abstract: We study social choice functions for societies confronting alternatives which can be described as vectors in a Euclidean space, and where all voters have preferences on these alternatives which are saturated at an ideal point and satisfy an appropriate restriction of single-peakedness.

Keywords: SOCIAL CHOICE; VOTING (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996
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Related works:
Working Paper: Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges (1996)
Journal Article: Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges (1998)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:inecpu:156

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