Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges
Jordi Masso and
Salvador Barberà ()
ASSET - Instituto De Economia Publica from ASSET (Association of Southern European Economic Theorists)
We study social choice functions for societies confronting alternatives which can be described as vectors in a Euclidean space, and where all voters have preferences on these alternatives which are saturated at an ideal point and satisfy an appropriate restriction of single-peakedness.
Keywords: SOCIAL CHOICE; VOTING (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges (1998)
Working Paper: Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges (1996)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:inecpu:156
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