Testing Employment determination in Unionised Economices as a Repeated Gam e

Sara De La Rica () and Maria Paz Espinosa ()

ASSET - Instituto De Economia Publica from ASSET (Association of Southern European Economic Theorists)

Abstract: This paper is an empirical analysis of alternative bargaining theories of wage and employment determination. Using data from manufacturing sectors of the Spanish economy, we find that unions and firms are not myopic and take dynamic considerations into account in the bargaining process.

Keywords: TESTS; EMPLOYMENT; WAGES (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 J50 J51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996

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Journal Article: Testing Employment Determination in Unionised Economies as a Repeated Game (1997)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:inecpu:157

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