Competition from Managers Mroduct Market Efficiency

F. Barros and Ines Macho-Stadler ()

ASSET - Instituto De Economia Publica from ASSET (Association of Southern European Economic Theorists)

Abstract: We investigate whether competition between two firms to hire managers with different abilities might affect the product markets efficiency, when a manager's effort once hired is or her private information. We conclude that competition for managers might lead to an efficiency improvement in the market of the firm that attracts the most efficient manager.

Keywords: COMPETITION; MANAGERS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: M10 M12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997

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