Cooperative Interim Contract and Re-Contract: Chandler's M-Form Firm

T. Ichiishi and Murat R. Sertel

ASSET - Instituto De Economia Publica from ASSET (Association of Southern European Economic Theorists)

Abstract: The present paper proposes new concepts and a new scenario with which to analyze cooperative interim contracting and re-contracting in an organization.

Keywords: INFORMATION; GAME THEORY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D20 D80 L20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997

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Related works:
Working Paper: Cooperative Interim Contract and Re-Contract: Chandler's M-Form Firm (1996)
Journal Article: Cooperative interim contract and re-contract: Chandler's M-form firm (1998)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:inecpu:161

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