Cost Manipulation in an Asymmetric Oligopoly: The Taxation Problem

Ngo Van Long and Antoine Soubeyran ()

ASSET - Instituto De Economia Publica from ASSET (Association of Southern European Economic Theorists)

Abstract: This paper analyzes the problem of altering the cost structure within an oligopoly, in the presence of costs of manipulation. Oligopolistic firms (which differ from each other in production costs) compete a la Cournot in the second stage, taking as given firm-specific taxes or input prices. In the first stage, a government, or a regulatory agency, or a mnopolistic input supplier, sets firm-specific taxes, charges, or input prices, to manipulate the cost structure of its agents, in order to maximize some objective function.

Keywords: OLIGOPOLIES; COSTS; GAMES; TAXATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 D43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997
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Working Paper: Cost Manipulation in an Asymmetric Oligopoly: The Taxation Problem (1998)
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