Compliance Monitoring and Agri-Environmental Policy

Chongwoo Choe () and Iain Fraser ()

Working Papers from La Trobe - Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper uses an optimal contract approach to examine the issue of compliance monitoring in agri-environmental policy when the farmer is risk neutral and risk averse. The environmental agency chooses monitoring accuracy and payments for farmer's (non-)compliance. With a risk-neutral farmer, an optimal policy involves maximum allowable reward for compliance and maximum allowable penalty for non-compliance.

Keywords: INFORMATION; ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 Q28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997
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Journal Article: Compliance Monitoring and Agri-Environmental Policy (1999)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:latrob:97.08

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