Serial Cost Sharing with Many Goods and General Aggregation

C. Tejedo and M. Truchon

Working Papers from Laval - Recherche en Politique Economique

Abstract: The Serial Cost Sharing Rule has been conceived originally for problems where agents ask for different quantities of an homogeneous private good, the sum of which is produced by a single facility. In this context, it is endowed with a variety of desirable equity and coherency properties. This paper investigates the extension of this rule to the context where agents ask many goods that may be specific to some of them and where the aggregation rule may be very general.

Keywords: GAME THEORY; SERIAL COST SHARING (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:lavape:0007

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