Is Workers' Compensation Disguised Unemployment Insurance?

Bernard Fortin (), P. Lanoie and C. Laporte

Working Papers from Laval - Recherche en Politique Economique

Abstract: This paper examines how the Workers'Compensation (WC) and the Unemployment Insurance (UI) programs interact to influence the duration of claims due to workplace accidents.

Keywords: UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE; MORAL HAZARD; CONSTRUCTION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J28 J31 J33 J65 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996

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Related works:
Working Paper: Is Workers' Compensation Disguised Unemployment Insurance? (1995)
Working Paper: Is Workers' Compensation Disguised Unemployment Insurance? (1996)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:lavape:9601

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