Rivalry in the U.S. Airline Industry

Philippe Barla ()

Working Papers from Laval - Recherche en Politique Economique

Abstract: This paper examines how the Workers'Compensation (WC) and the Unemployment Insurance (UI) programs interact to influence the duration of claims due to workplace accidents. In this paper, we use Market Share Instability (MSI) as a measure of the intensity of competition among airlines on a specific route. This measure is used to capture not only price competition but also non-price competition notably capacity competition. We test the effect of different variables (used in pricing studies) on MSI on a sample of 400 routes over the period 1987 to 1993.

Keywords: INDUSTRY; COMPETITION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L10 L90 L93 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996

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Working Paper: Rivalry in the U.S. Airline Industry (1996)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:lavape:9603

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