Do Low-Price Guarantees Facilitate Collusion?

Morten Hviid and G. Shaffer

Working Papers from Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory

Keywords: pricing; competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: Written
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Working Paper: Do low-price Guarantees facilitate Collusion? (1994)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:michet:94-01

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