When is the Standard Analysis of Common Property Extraction Under Free Access Correct? -- A Game - Theoretic Justification for Non Game-Theoretic Analyses
Michael Murray and
Stephen Salant ()
Working Papers from Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory
Keywords: COMMON PROPERTY; ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM; GAME THEORY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: When Is the Standard Analysis of Common Property Extraction under Free Access Correct? A Game-Theoretic Justification for Non-Game-Theoretic Analyses (1999)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:michet:95-10
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Address: UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS CENTER FOR RESEARCH ON ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL THEORY, ANN ARBOR MICHIGAN U.S.A.
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