Optimal Compensation Contracts with Pay-For-Performance and Termination Incentives

Greg Hallman and Jay C. Hartzell

New York University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper Seires from New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business-

Abstract: This paper studies optimal compensation contracts in the presence of both pay-for-performance and termination incentives. While these incentives have been studied independently, this paper’s model is the first to incorporate both. The primary result is

Date: 1999-12
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:nystfi:99-053

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