Abstract:
The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (as amended in 1970) prohibits mutual funds in the US from offering their advisers asymmetric "incentive fee" contracts in which the advises are rewarded for superior performance via-a-vis a chosen index but are not correspondingly penalized for underforming it. The rationale offered in defense of the regulation by both the SEC and Congress is that incentive fee structures of this sort encourage "excessive" risk-taking by advisers.
More papers in New York University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper Seires from New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business- Address: U.S.A.; New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics . 44 West 4th Street. New York, New York 10012-1126 Contact information at EDIRC. Series data maintained by Thomas Krichel ().
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