Abstract:
This paper analyses the experience with rule-based monetary policy in African countries which have participated in monetary unions (CFA Franc Zone, Eastern African Currency Board and Rand Monetary Area). We show that African countries have generally lacked the domestic political institutions which would allow individual governments to tie their hands by establishing such rules. Monetary unions have proved to be an alternative possibility for credible commitment to sound macroeconomic policies, but only in cases where exit from a union is made costly by the provision of side-payments (or sanctions) in other areas of regional co-operation, and only when governance structures have been designed so as to maximise chances for the enforcement of monetary rules. We conclude by making suggestions about the design of African monetary unions.
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More papers in Working Papers Series from Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford Address: Centre for the Study of African Economies Institute of Economics and Statistics University of Oxford St. Cross Building, Manor Road Oxford, OX1 3UL, UK. Contact information at EDIRC. Series data maintained by Thomas Krichel ().
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